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Notes and Comments
John Barnes* and
Randal Marlin**

Radical Criminology and the
Law Reform Commission of
Canada - A Reply to
Professor M. R. Goode

Professor M. R. Goode' has recently attacked the criminal law work
of the Law Reform Commission of Canada as "profoundly
unsatisfactory" ' 2 because the Commission has apparently adopted
an outmoded theory of the criminal process. He maintains that the
approach of the Commission has been vitiated by
...what may be loosely called a liberal-positivist ideology,
which fails to question the most fundamental bases of the
criminal process in a 3democratic capitalist society and the faiths
which underlie them.
This failing to question or to-give written consideration to current
criticisms of this ideology has led, in Goode's view, to "the
bankruptcy of the Commission's philosophical approach". 4 This is
a serious charge; our purpose is to show that Goode fails to
substantiate it.
Goode argues that the Commission accepted a "value-consensus
model" of society, a model possessing two major premises:
...that there exists in society a fundamental agreement as to the
values which the society wishes to, in some way, uphold: and
that that consensus is reflected in the law making, law applying
and law interpreting practices of political authority". 5
6
By contrast, Goode notes the existence of a "value antagonism"
model according to which society is characterized by conflict rather
*John Barnes, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University
**Randal Marlin, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Carleton
University
1. M. R. Goode, Law Reform Commission of Canada - Political Ideology of
CriminalProcessReform (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 653
2. Id. at 669
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5. Id. at 657
6. Id. at 664
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than consensus with the legal system imposing the values of
dominant groups on the less powerful. This model is accepted by
"radical criminologists" who deny that there is fundamental
agreement as to society's values and hold instead that "society is
characterized by diversity and conflict on a large scale, and that
social authority is wielded by and for an economic meritocracy
which controls the means of production in the society". 7 Law, seen
in this light, exists to protect and perpetuate the interests of the
dominant groups.
The proper questions to ask, bearing in mind the second model,
are: Whose interests are served by existing or proposed laws? What
are the class affiliations of those who propose, criticise, legislate
and administer the laws?
In Goode's view, the Commission far too often pronounces on
the nature and value of the criminal law in terms that suggest there is
little or no dissent. For example, the Commission states that,
"[c]rime uncoped with is unjust: to the victim, to potential victims
and to all of us", 8 or, "We have, we would contend, a basic right to
protect ourselves from harm and in particular from the harmful acts
of others" 9 - as if there were a clear "we" and "them". (The
emphasis is Goode's.) Goode contends that "there is no 'us' and
'them', and.

. .

the criminal law should not belong to 'us' ".1o

The Commission report, Our Criminal Law,1 1 sees the criminal
law as "fundamentally a moral system

. . .

it is a system of applied

morality and justice". 1 2 To Goode, however, the Commission's
weakness lies in its failure to specify whose morality. "Who, really
are 'we'? What, really, is the content of 'our' consensual morality?
Who decides?". 13
Goode criticises the Commission for apparently accepting the
value-consensus model and for failing to deal with the issues raised
by the radical criminologists. He does not openly avow the value
antagonism theory, although he might be taken to have implied his
7. Id. at 666
8. Law Reform Commission of Canada Report, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1976) at 1, quoted by Goode, id. at 671
9. Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Meaning of Guilt (CriminalLaw:
Strict Liability) (Working Paper #2) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 5,
quoted by Goode, id. at 671, n. 77
10. Id. at 671
11. Supra, note 8
12. Id. at 16, quoted by Goode, supra, note I at 671-72
13. Goode, id. at 672
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acceptance of it, for he maintains both that the Commission's
philosophy is "erroneous" and that the value consensus model
(which is the way he characterises the Commission's philosophy)
4
contradicts the value antagonism model. An initial reaction to Goode's paper is likely to be surprise that of
all commissions such criticisms should be directed at the Law
Reform Commission of Canada. The federal commission has
consistently drawn on the assistance of sociologists and
criminologists who, we must presume, have been familiar with
recent writings in their field. 15 The first chairman, Mr. Justice E. P.
Hartt, stressed the fragmentation of values in modern society and
conceived of law as an instrument of minimum intervention which
should promote the peaceful co-existence of different opinions. 16
The Commission has sought actively to accommodate diverse views
through extensive public consultation. 17 It has questioned the
value-base of the present law at every stage. For example, the
Commission has refused to suggest revisions of the law on offences
against property until there has been a fundamental consideration of
the role of property in Canadian society, indicating awareness of the
point of view that the only difference between "theft" and "sharp
business practice" is the class of the person involved. ' 8
Much of the Commission's work, then, is consistent with the
findings of the radical criminologists. The latter apparently favour a
withering away of law as an instrument of centralized social control.
With such a development the Commission is largely in sympathy,
since it recommends greater restraint in resort to the criminal
sanction which should only be employed in cases of serious wrong
and genuine harm. 19
Thus the Commission does not anticipate an entire withering
away. It argues, rightly we submit, that there are certain core
values, such as freedom from bodily injury, which people agree that
the law should be used to protect and has sought to identify these.
14. Id. at 664
15. See list of outside studies, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fourth
Annual Report, 1974-75, In Sight of Land ....
(Ottawa: Information Canada,
1975) at 25-27
16. See J. Barnes, The Law Reform Commission of Canada (1975), 2 Dalhousie
L.J. 62 at 73-74
17. Id. at 79-90; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Second Annual Report,
1972-73, The Worst Form of Tyranny (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 11-13
18. Supra, note 15 at 11
19. Supra, note 8 at 27-35
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It is worth recalling in this connection a criticism of radical
criminology made recently by Leon Radzinowicz and J. F. S. King
who wrote, referring to the radicals:
They have overstated the heterogeneity of social values, ignoring
the large measure of consensus, even among the oppressed, in
condemning the theft and violence that make up the bulk of
traditional crime. . . . And they have indulged in exaggerated
hopes of human nature, been over-optimistic about what society
will tolerate, either now or in the future. 20
It is obviously difficult to articulate the core values in any other
than a general way and this has led to frequent charges of vagueness
made against the Commission. But the merit of its work lies in the
fact that for the first time an effort has been made to develop a
philosophy for the use of the criminal law in Canada, to state what
21
functions it should serve.
In its enquiries, the Commission has taken the optimistic position
that consensus should be sought, even if the consensus is merely
agreement to differ. It has shunned the recommendation of simple
answers, likely only to compound present problems, preferring
continual informed debate. It then becomes difficult to see how
Goode can accuse the Commission of promoting unitary interests.
The method of law reform used by the Commission is law reform
by persuasion or education. 22 Realizing that the co-operation and
sympathy of the public and of legal officials is needed for the
practical implementation of reforms, it has recognized that change
of attitudes is more the road to genuine change than mere legislative
revision. Such a method involves informed debate to achieve
acceptable results.
The constitutional framework of the Canadian criminal process
makes discussion and persuasion all the more necessary, since
criminal control is a combined federal-provincial venture. The
parties must act in co-operation and for this reason common ground
must be found.
Assuredly, consensus is not the whole story. The majority, even a
very large majority, is not always right. Intellectual leaders have
always the duty to speak out against mass prejudices enshrined in
the criminal law. But while the Commission might be faulted for
20. Times LiterarySupplement, September 26, 1975 at 1089

21. See J. Barnes, CriminalLaw Reform; CanadianStyle, [1976] Crim. L.R. 299;
supra, note 8 at 38-40
22. Barnes, id. andsupra, note 16
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giving insufficient expression to the limitations on consensus in its
published writings, it could hardly be taken to hold a consensus-iseverything philosophy. Such a view would be contradicted by its
stress on a two-way educational approach - where the Commission
analyzes, evaluates and enters into dialogue with the public. There
is no clear consensus on the abortion question, but the Commission
has made no recommendation, as yet, to remove abortion provisions
from the Criminal Code. If consensus, and nothing else, mattered,
why should it be necessary to embark on a detailed examination of
the question rather than simply recognizing disagreement and
automatically recommending decriminalization?
It is noteworthy that Goode himself gives little hint as to his own
view of the way in which the legal system should be re-modelled.
Indeed, he seems to appeal approvingly to the very consensus model
which he attacks (or more frequently reports as having been
attacked by others). For in questioning the idea that the criminal law
should enforce some morality, he writes:
If there is no minimal social consensus, if there is no reflection of
any possible common morality in social legal institutional
decision making, then enforcement of morality can easily
become a fagade for the imposition of the will of one social group
upon another. 23
Here, it appears, Goode feels that such an imposition would be a
bad thing. But why would it be bad? Presumably because the
imposed-on group does not share the morality of the imposing group
-in other words because there is lack of consensus.
Goode also concludes his commentary with the hope that
...some of the issues raised herein will spark further public and
academic debate concerning the matter which touches all citizens
most closely: the criminal process which should be in place in
Canada.24

Why should one have this hope unless one felt - as the
Commission plainly feels - that such discussion would promote
harmony and agreement?
Goode's technique of argument is to take isolated passages from
Commission papers and to identify in these resemblances to the
descriptive liberal-positivist or value-consensus theory. He then
recites the attacks made on the theory and concludes that the
23. Supra, note 1 at 672
24. Id. at 674
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Commission's work must suffer from the same deficiencies. His
technique is to find guilt by association. The argument is a sloppy
substitute for more careful and direct analysis of the views and
methods of the Commission, a body seeking to articulate the
direction in which the law ought to go.
Goode's exaggerated criticism of the Commission is marred by a
blurring of two distinct questions: (1) the factual question of what
and whose interests the law has represented and now represents, and
(2) the moral question of what and whose interests the law ought to
represent. The answer to the first question may give some insight
into the significance of various laws, but it does not by itself answer
the second question. Even if it could be shown that the law has
always represented the interests of some dominant group, it does not
follow that a legal system reflecting a consensus, if attainable,
would not be a desideratum. But perhaps the consensus is not
attainable. Even so, there is the possibility of a lesser or greater
approximation to consensus and of improvements relating to the
latter.
If Goode's point about the "bankruptcy" of the Commission's
thinking is to be sustained, he has to show something like one of the
following: either (1) that no moral consensus in society is possible
to any significant extent, and the striving for consensus is
misguided, or (2) that by failing to examine the class biases in our
inherited legal system the Commission has uncritically accepted a
status quo and endorsed an unjust system.
Neither of these propositions is given adequate support by
Goode. Indeed, the reality of the Commission's philosophy and
method of law reform gives support to the contrary.

